



# Dialogue on Kashmir

**March 2004**

JKCHR  
Jammu and Kashmir Council for Human Rights

## **Dialogue on Kashmir**

### **From a Management of Violence to a Management of Politics**

**The** representatives of a civil society have to resemble their society in terms of age, gender, social class, ethnic background and so forth. Jammu and Kashmir cannot be an exception to the full circle of this wisdom. More so there ought to be a mandate to represent the public interest in the conduct of public affairs and during other special circumstances. Dialogue amongst themselves or with India and Pakistan is a special circumstance.

**Therefore** it is self evident that without a reference to the people, their views cannot be appropriately ascertained and then forcefully articulated. Although there are Kashmiri Governments elected by the electorate to conduct the public affairs yet the people of Jammu and Kashmir seem unhurried to correct the political disarray on the question of Rights Movement.

**Historically** there has been an absence of internal democratization in the civil society of Kashmir and over the years it has largely neutralised its potential for democratising the State. This is the reason that much could not be done to find the ways in which civil society and the State can be re-appropriated in the interests of democracy and in finding a resolution to the Kashmir dispute.

**The** ability to exercise a ‘mature judgement’ and an ‘enlightened conscience’ attracts more significance when it comes to dispense an obligation to the people of Jammu and Kashmir distributed under three administrations – one on the Indian side at Srinagar/Jammu and two on the side of Pakistan at Muzaffarabad and Gilgit. The overriding sovereign interests of India and Pakistan raise the ceiling of this merit. An accountable, transparent and a democratic political culture is always on the side of the people.

**In** January 2004 India and Pakistan agreed on a composite dialogue. Leaders of the two countries stated that “the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides”.

**The** Islamabad joint statement of January 2004 is in no way different to Tashkent Declaration of 1966, Shimla Accord of 1972, Lahore Declaration of 1999 and the Agra Summit of 2001. Like other bilateral declarations, accords and summits the joint statement nudge passes to recognize the leadership of Kashmir.

**In** May 2000, the Government of India made a public declaration to have a dialogue with APHC. The offer had created a two tiered benefit for APHC. On the one hand it was an exclusive offer and on the other it caused a recognition of the amalgam. The offer of the dialogue also created a wider constituency of witnesses. Hurriet itself was a united forum and had yet to soil its hands by the slaughter of A G Lone.

**APHC** which had grown from the ashes of MUF, when it decided to change its horses mid-stream after 1987 elections – from a constitutional path to the use of violence failed to relate the offer to its duty under chapter II articles 2(i) and 2(ii) of the constitution.

**Non** APHC political schools also failed in the discharge of a public trust. They did not have a ‘mature judgement’ to relate the offer to an earlier promise by Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao that ‘sky-is-the-limit’, Prime Minister A B Vajpayee’s reference to a ‘constitution of insaniyat’ and another supplement offered by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi of an ‘unconditional dialogue with all, including those who did not take part in the elections’.

**Our** leadership failed to understand the jurisprudence of life and number in Jammu and Kashmir. On the one hand it encouraged the death of a generation and on the other failed to construct alternative modes of politics. It has failed to convince the people that a State dictated political discourse is not a final word on political arrangements in Jammu and Kashmir.

**The** three references - ‘sky-is-the-limit’, ‘constitution of insaniyat’ and that of an ‘unconditional dialogue with all, including those who did not take part in the elections’, had provided an ideal opening to move from a management of violence to a management of politics. Unfortunately the leadership failed to rise to the occasion and understand that Dialogue is the most ancient practice, of seeking a respectful communication and mutual understanding.

**It** is true that a fear psychosis has been the main cause that the civil society could not be animated in Jammu and Kashmir during the past 13 years. The sphere of an expressed politics remained restricted. But if there were an accountable, transparent and a democratic political culture, life saving opportunities provided by Hizb cease-fire of June 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s cease-fire in honour of Ramazan in November 2000 and the Hurriet cease-fire of November 2001 would not have been wasted. Unfortunately a privatized and a commercialised political culture would not re-orient its priorities in the interests of the people. It is for private and commercial reasons that the people were not put first.

**The** leadership in Kashmir and the establishment in Islamabad did not give way to Hizb chief commander Abdul Majid Dar when he dared on 24 July 2000 and said:

“**HM** has been aware for some time of the feelings of the people for peace for some time now and the Majilis-e-Shora which meets at the beginning of every year to review the position and finalise its strategy accordingly had held an extraordinary session at Muzaffarabad in the beginning of this year. After long and careful deliberation, the meeting decided to take the initiative to end the deadlock, which was stifling the people and to change the perception that the mujahids were bloodthirsty terrorists... The wishes of the public were also gauged and it was realised that desire for a peaceful solution of the issue by an unconditional and meaningful dialogue obtained among all sections of the society including the local political leadership and the media... Thus after due deliberations, the command council of HM has taken a decision to announce unilateral temporary cease-fire for three months which would come into effect w.e.f. July 25, 2000.

**Kashmiri** leaders failed to position their response in the common interests of the people. They failed to relate to the fact that India and Pakistan are enduring a cease-fire since 1949. The cease-fire of 24 July 2000 was the first and the only cease-fire

between India and a Kashmiri militant organization. It was neither a surrender nor a sell out. It was a provisional and a conditional decision, to set a climate for the consideration of the principal dispute, for which horses were changed mid-stream after 1987 elections.

**Indian** State articulated an unconditional offer of talks and Prime Minister Vajpayee said – “Our doors are open. I appeal to all militant groups and organizations, which believe in peace to join the Centre’s efforts for a peaceful resolution of Kashmir issue--Leave the constitution. Talks should be held within the limits of ‘insaniyat’ so that violence is stopped and no more blood is shed”.

**Majid** Dar was killed. He was put to death just for a common statement that “HM has been aware for some time of the feelings of the people for peace”. Abdul Gani Lone was gunned down to quell an overwhelming, effective and attractive voice favouring right to life in a peaceful Kashmir.

**Hurriet** roller skated on an enormous popular grievance against the Government of India and missed three valuable opportunities provided by Hizb cease-fire of June 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s cease-fire in honour of Ramazan in November 2000 and the Hurriet cease-fire of November 2001.

**The** recent move by Maulana Abbas Ansari lead Hurriet of an audience with Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani is appreciable but it is too late and associated with many problems. Ansari faction of Hurriet may have the consolation of qualifying the test of ‘constitutionality’ but in the ordinary sense of the local politics, one cannot stop noticing the ‘physicality’ of the Ali Shah Gilani lead faction either. More so the two factions of Hurriet on their own do not complete the full circle of political wisdom and public interest in Kashmir. The non Hurriet political groups and civil society institutions are important in the completion of the circle of wisdom.

**At** their meeting on 22 January the two sides claimed that they struck a harmonious note agreeing to carry forward negotiations to evolve ‘a step-by-step approach for the resolution of ‘all outstanding issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir’. It is for the first time that Hurriet has added a new burden of ‘all outstanding issues relating to Jammu and Kashmir’ to the political debate in Jammu and Kashmir. If ‘all outstanding issues’ include matters relating to the other two administrations on the side of Pakistan and other associate interests of 2.5 million Kashmiri refugees living in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, then it makes a sense.

**Is** Hurriet tailored for the challenge? How has it opened the account of the interests of Kashmiri people at its first meeting with the Government of India? These are important questions. The text of the agreed statement does not encourage us in this regard. It reveals that Hurriet leaders were unprepared and their understanding of the jurisprudence of Kashmir case is unreliable. They failed to show that they have a mature judgement to position themselves in the interests of their people and to re-orient priorities.

**The** statement of Prof. Bhat that “we have had amicable, free, frank, fair and fruitful discussions” does not reassure us of their ability to negotiate for a ‘maximum agreement keeping a margin of disagreement’. It is appreciable that they came clean and advocated that “the role of the gun should be replaced by the sound of politics”.

**It** may be an admission too late but after all this admission has its own merit. At least they are grudgingly wiser to admit that ‘the earth revolves round the sun’. A selfless admission would have saved a generation from death. It would have saved Dar and Lone from an untimely and a precipitated death. It would have saved the civil society from massive violations of human rights and from an unprecedented trauma.

**Hurriet** has accrued a liability for feigning to have a command and control of politics and militancy. They are accountable for a diversion from the ‘sound of politics’ to the ‘sound of a gun’ in 1987. A rigged election or a defeat in an election does not legitimize the use of an indiscriminate violence to seek a compliance of your bidding.

**The** people of Jammu and Kashmir launched a Rights Movement in 1877 and successfully concluded the demand of ‘state for state’s people’, the need for a ‘responsible government and people’s association’, ‘rights movement’ securing the freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

**It** finally accelerated into a demand of ‘quit Kashmir’. Their struggle spread over 113 years from 1877 to 1990 cost them 22 lives in 1931. While as the Hurriet that has come of age and wants to switch over to the ‘sound of politics’ consumed a generation in just 13 years. The question of a liability in the discharge of a public trust continues as an associate issue, today, tomorrow and day after.

**Hurriet** leaders may not have seen their red noses but their body language on television would not lie. I am sure that they would have felt the heat when Deputy Prime Minister of India made a fair attempt to invoke the ghost of their ‘enlightened conscience’ and asked them “to cover all regions and concerns of all communities inhabiting Jammu and Kashmir”. Unlike Prof. Bhat, Advani made another plain and honest confession that the ‘meeting was a good beginning’. He avoided the adjectives and superlatives otherwise used by Hurriet.

**Hurriet** not only agreed to evolve a “step by step approach for the resolution of all outstanding issues”, but it also committed itself to “the enlargement of the dialogue process to cover all regions of Jammu and Kashmir and the concerns of all communities”. It is a welcome advance.

**The** second round of talks towards the end of March would require that the parties have made a progress on the issues identified and agreed on 22 January 2004. Principal among the action list for Hurriet is to enlarge the dialogue process to cover all regions of Jammu and Kashmir and the concerns of all communities.

**It** is evident that parties that succeed to keep their word would press for an early and many more meetings. It would be sincerely eager to energize the process. And if for any reason Hurriet fails to enlarge the dialogue process to cover all regions of Jammu and Kashmir and the concerns of all communities, it will drag feet to keep away from

the process. Government of India on her part has a duty to 'reasonableness and fairness', in her phased interaction with Hurriet and in ensuring a corporate approach.

**One** cannot walk away from the principle of 'dialogue as an age old and respectful' means of communication. One may however, have justifiable reasons to argue that the present make up of the dialogue does not represent the full circle of Kashmiri interest. It is important to bear in mind that it is not only a Kashmiri leadership that has started a dialogue with the Government of India, there is a much more serious interest between India and Pakistan to construct peace for their people.

**On** 18 April 2003 Prime Minister Vajpayee in his address in Srinagar committed himself to a deep desire to save democracy, humanity and Kashmiriyat in Kashmir and at the same time extended a hand of friendship to Pakistan. A window of opportunity is available to the people of Kashmir and it should be an overriding interest of every member of civil society that they stand up in defence of these Kashmir specifics.

**Kashmiris** are making noises that they should be included in the process and it would be a serious mistake if they fail to walk through this window of opportunity. It is encouraging that Prime Minister Vajpayee laid the canvas of Kashmir specifics and Deputy Prime Minister has assisted the Kashmiri leaders by defining their roles i.e.; "the enlargement of the dialogue process to cover all regions of Jammu and Kashmir and the concerns of all communities". At least the Government of India has made a singular and a positive advance in relation to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

**Kashmiri** leadership cannot enlarge the dialogue process to cover all regions of Jammu and Kashmir and the concerns of all communities until and unless it does not position itself viz a viz India and Pakistan in the best interests of their people. In this regard it is important that they keep an open mind in regards to the areas under the administration of Pakistan.

**Public** interest demands that they examine the merits of the 23 October 2001 statement of the Prime Minister of India. He asked, "What is the condition of the areas occupied by Pakistan? There is no democracy, no rights for the people living there. Recently there was an election, but the power was handed over to an Army General". The statement makes a number of important reference to 'occupation', 'conditions', 'democracy', 'rights of the people', 'elections', and the transfer of 'power' in the 'area controlled by Pakistan'.

**It** would be interesting to note as to how India and Pakistan move on their composite dialogue and how India and Hurriet are braced to reconcile the two processes. Hurriet or non Hurriet leadership does not seem much bothered about the basic fact that the people of Jammu and Kashmir are distributed under three Kashmiri administrations and that the influences of India and Pakistan are overriding in their respective areas of control.

**The** people of Jammu and Kashmir (State as a whole) have an instrument of accession with India. This accession of course is disputed by the people. Pakistan on its part failed to keep to the terms of a Stand Still Agreement with the Government of Kashmir.

**Indian** interest by virtue of the instrument of accession and by virtue of a resolution of its parliament extends into Azad Kashmir and Northern areas. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir adopted on 17 November 1956 defines the territories of the State as one which on the fifteenth day of August 1947 were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Ruler of the State. The fact that this Constitution recognizes the States accession to India is a corresponding insurance that a ‘trade off’ of any part of Kashmir territory as a solution has its own problems on the Indian side.

**The** people of Jammu and Kashmir have no such accession with Pakistan. Article 257 of the constitution of Pakistan, however, stipulates a point and a process in future, by virtue of which the people of Jammu and Kashmir ‘may’ accede to Pakistan. Article 257 of the constitution of Pakistan stipulates that - “When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State”.

**This** signifies that there will be no automatic merger of the territories of the State with Pakistan and the conditions under which other States acceded to Pakistan will not necessarily apply to the State, if the people of the State are not in favour of such application. The terms of the instrument of accession will be determined by mutual agreement.

**The** constitution of Pakistan rightly details the process of future relations keeping in with the principle of a ‘transfer of free will’. But in practice the Government of Pakistan continues to violate the ‘freedom of expression’ and has introduced a constitutional restraint to bar any transfer of free will in the election of public representatives in Azad Kashmir.

**Section** 4(7)(2) of the Azad Kashmir Constitution authored by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, is a negative restraint on the freedom of association and freedom to vote. According to this restraint, “No person or political party in Azad Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to, the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan”.

**This** negative restraint under section 4(7)(2) of the Azad Kashmir Constitution violates the Part II Section A (3) of 13 August 1948 UNCIP Resolution as well. According to this “pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission”. Unfortunately Pakistan did not allow UN process to take its course in Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas.

**Under** UNCIP resolutions, the area west of cease-fire-line, when evacuated by Pakistani troops should be administered by local authorities – that is, existing District Magistrates or sub-ordinate officers, according to the law and custom of the State as they existed before the dispute arose. Each District Magistrate was to be under the supervision of a United Nations Officer.

**It** is clear that Pakistan has not allowed Azad Kashmir to take a shape as stipulated by UNCIP resolutions. An assumption of control over these territories is a principal

breach of responsibilities under UNCIP resolutions. It has carried the Kashmir case far away from a solvable position to a dreadful fate of unending misery. Pakistan's poise in relation to UN resolutions raises many more questions. Firstly, why is it that, Pakistan decided not to allow the UN to take its course in Azad Kashmir. A mechanism that would have empowered the people at Muzaffarabad was frustrated.

**Pakistan** has found its foothold in Azad Kashmir by subscribing to a belief that it is "assuming its responsibilities under UNCIP Resolutions". It however, does not define the limits of these responsibilities. It does not provide for a mechanism which one could invoke in case of an abuse of this assumed authority. The assumption of these responsibilities is not in keeping with the basic principle that powers would be exercised reasonably and in good faith, for proper purposes only and in accordance with the spirit as well as the letter of the empowering Act. The empowering Act in this case are the UNCIP Resolutions.

**On** the Pakistan side of the Kashmir, the existing constitutional discipline too does not support any consideration along religious lines. The declaration of the Provisional Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, emphatically lays down that the administration of the State would not be a communal Government. It has assured the inclusion of Muslims as well as non Muslims in the cabinet. It further assures to enable the people to elect by their free vote a popular legislature and a popular Government. It takes upon to safeguard the identity of Jammu and Kashmir as a political entity. It is however, true that the provisional government was never allowed to function according to the tenets of the declaration.

**It** is interesting to note that the Pakistani position on Jammu and Kashmir is self-contradicting and crisscross. It walks away from its avowed responsibilities under UNCIP resolutions and takes a different form of control in the Northern Areas. In the case of Gilgit and Baltistan Pakistan seeks to rely on a dodgy agreement of 28 April 1949. The parties to the agreement – Government of Azad Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference a political party and the Government of Pakistan, make it a suspicious agreement. The agreement has been over taken by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act 1974 and the March 1993 decision of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court.

**Since** Hurriet in its meeting on 22 January 2004 with the Deputy Prime Minister of India has committed itself "to cover all regions and concerns of all communities inhabiting Jammu and Kashmir", it has to take a decision and prove in that regard. It would be faced with the geographical and administrative jurisprudence influencing life under the three administrations of Jammu and Kashmir, at Srinagar, Muzaffarabad and Gilgit.

**India** and Pakistan too shall be faced with fundamental issues of jurisprudence during their future composite dialogue on Kashmir. The jurisprudence of the three administrative controls – one on the Indian side and two on the Pakistani side is not the same. It would be very difficult for India and Pakistan to trade the geography of Jammu and Kashmir and ignore the 127 year old Rights Movement of the people.

**On** the one hand India has to address the grievances of the people of Jammu and Kashmir in entirety and on the other it has to trade for peace with Pakistan. In the year

2004 Pakistan on her part is not in a position to seek a forced merger of Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas either. At the same time she has to trade peace with India as well.

**India** has to overcome the on going dispute in regards to the instrument of accession and examine in depth the cumulative mistrust that remains in the people due to the continued practice of a proxy politics. Pakistan too has its share of blame in the present miserable condition of the people of Kashmir. Its mechanics to propose and dispose a political culture during the last 13 years have earned it a full scale displeasure and anger in Kashmir. The abuse of a Muslim sentiment and the exploitation of the Rights Movement has caused Pakistan a loss of good will in the valley and in Kashmiris living around the world.

**Pakistan** has agreed that it would not allow the use of any territory under its control for conducting terrorism against India. The Indian proxy politics of last 56 years and the Pakistani proxy war of last 13 years seem to have reached their sell by date in Kashmir. It is time to empower the people.

**Pakistan** has to find a way around its present provisional assumption of responsibilities in Azad Kashmir under UNCIP Resolutions and around the decision of Azad Kashmir High Court on Gilgit and Baltistan. Article 257 of the Constitution would not allow any forced merger of these territories with Pakistan.

**As** a member nation of UN Pakistan would find it extremely difficult to walk away from its present avowed provisional responsibility under UNCIP Resolutions in Azad Kashmir. It cannot orchestrate a part Plebiscite in Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas. It has to make a choice between the Rights Movement of the people and the sovereign interests in the territory and its water interests embedded in Kashmir.

**We** note that there is an overemphasis on the ‘Question’ and the ‘Conflict’ of Kashmir and the regard for the people of Jammu and Kashmir is barely respectful and encouraging. There is a need that we begin to differentiate between the Rights Movement on the one hand and the conflict between India and Pakistan on the other. India – Pakistan conflict need not override the urgent need to preserve and protect life.

**The** history of these two dominions of the treatment of the question and the people of Kashmir too has remained incongruous and at times has manifested a double standard. It is required that the people of Jammu and Kashmir come first and become visible in any discussion that affects them as a people.

**Kashmir** is an exceptional case and it has to be settled using the jurisprudence agitated by bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan, bilateral agreements between the people of Kashmir and India, existing arrangements between the people of Azad Kashmir and people of Gilgit and Baltistan with Pakistan and the jurisprudence available at the UN.

**Moreover** we need to understand that the jurisprudence of grievance of the people of Jammu and Kashmir with India is different to the jurisprudence of grievance with Pakistan. India and Pakistan in their composite dialogue or the Kashmiri leadership in their dialogue with India and Pakistan shall be taking decisions which would affect

the coming generations. It is important that we finish with a better today so that our future generations start with a better tomorrow.

**The** second round of talks between Hurriyat led by Abbas Ansari and the Government of India is round the corner. This faction of Hurriyat is committed to enlarge the dialogue process to cover all regions of Jammu and Kashmir and the concerns of all communities. It should not mean that other faction of Hurriyat led by Ali Shah Gilani, other non Hurriyat schools of politics and civil society groups should suspend their interest in the case of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

**However,** more important than anything else is that they should position themselves in the best interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. They should not advance the sovereign interests of Delhi or Islamabad. It can be achieved only if we put the people first and fight the evil of a privatized and a commercialised political culture. The political culture has to be accountable, transparent and democratic. The use of violence against a member of a civil society should incur a criminal liability. The common man and woman should be free to make an informed decision.

**We** need to stress the fact that Governments serve the enlarged interests of the people in an organized manner and politicians forming such governments act in the interests of the people. 'Common good' and 'public interest' are the litmus test. Dialogues and contestations of a society with the State are necessary to animate a people's well being. And the site at which these encounters take place is always a civil society.

**Kashmiris** have constructed 'memorial of mistakes'. It is time that we accept that there is a partnership between 'those who are living and those who are dead and those who are to be born'.

**Public** interest alone gives a moral respectability to a leader. In a 'government for the people' a collective public interest takes precedence over the private interests of each citizen. Kashmiris remain associated with five governments (three Kashmiri and two of India and Pakistan) and five constitutions. So what are the reasons that the 'collective public interest' has continued to suffer?

**Kashmiri** political schools and civil society institutions, need to ensure that the window of opportunity opened for a dialogue with the Government of India remains open and Kashmir specific. It is important that a 'feel good' and trusting atmosphere generated between India and Pakistan, is used as a basis to push the collective interests of the people in the feuding context of India and Pakistan. The people of Kashmir have to short list their grievances against India and Pakistan in the order of priority. The three administrations have to position themselves in accordance with the nature of their control. The process could be conducted severally in the beginning and co-ordinated collectively at a later stage.

**However,** it is important that the common Kashmiri should see himself as a beneficiary of the 'feel good factor' and other confidence building measures between India and Pakistan. He should also feel a difference and change in his and her daily life since the first meeting of 22 January 2004 between Kashmiri leadership and the Government of India. The area of benefit should not remain India – Pakistan specific.

**Indian** Government had a genuine complaint that the Kashmiri leadership did not position itself in the collective good of the people and had been supplanted to steel Islamabad's interest viz a viz India. The Indian argument had its own merit at home and abroad. In a sharp contrast to the Kashmiri leadership's approach to a dialogue, Pakistan on its part was all out to have an unconditional dialogue with India, any time and anywhere.

**Now** that the leadership of Kashmir as an aggrieved party and India in response, as a party to answer a case, two out of a complex of three parties (third one being Pakistan) have started a dialogue, when the Prime Minister of India on 18 April 2003 in his address in Srinagar committed himself to a deep desire to save democracy, humanity and Kashmiriyat in Kashmir and the Prime Minister of India on October 23, 2001 has expressed his concern on the 'occupation', 'conditions', 'democracy', 'rights of the people', 'elections', and the transfer of 'power' in the 'area controlled by Pakistan', the people of Kashmir on the Indian side in particular and others living on the side of Pakistan in general should feel a difference in the air.

**It** should not be a difference in the life as a 'state' but a difference in the life as a 'quality'. Kashmiris welcome the hand of friendship extended to Pakistan and the joint efforts to settle difference through the age old instrument of a dialogue. In the present context the Government of India in particular and the Government of Pakistan in general, need to be seen following the equation of the 'Golden Rule' of – "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you".

**The** people of Jammu and Kashmir have matured through their suffering. They understand that – "How you die is quite important. But, by far more important is, how you live". It is time that the curse of a multiple violence is lifted from their heads and parties move from a management of violence to a management of politics. Let the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide in peace, how they want to live.

**March 2004**

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**JKCHR  
FREEPOST  
P.O. BOX 241  
LONDON SW17 9LJ**

**Tel: 0208 640 8630**

**Fax: 0208 640 8546**

**Email: [info@jkchr.com](mailto:info@jkchr.com)**